Author Response by Archer, L et al.
 Author Response 
LOUISE ARCHER,1 EMILY DAWSON,2 AMY SEAKINS,1 JENNIFER DEWITT,1 
BILLY WONG3 1King’s College London; 2University College London; and 
3Roehampton University 
Correspondence to: Louise Archer; e-mail: Louise.archer@kcl.ac.uk 1 
RESPONSE TO “CRITICAL RESPONSE TO ARCHER ET AL . . . .” 
We hoped that our paper might prompt further thought and discussion and we welcome 
dialogue around the idea of science capital.1 As we discuss, the paper sets out “our initial 
attempts” at developing the concept and “a first iteration” of a quantitative instrument to 
“measure” science capital—we do not claim to have yet worked through all the 
intricacies and implications (or potential!) of the concept. 
We found the response a mixed bag. We were somewhat disappointed and frustrated by 
some basic misunderstanding of our arguments—notably the “straw doll” accusation that 
we are espousing a “push toward science capital as distinct from cultural capital” and a 
supposed “reification of science” (allegations that we strongly refute, below). However, 
there were some potentially interesting ideas around field that we are exploring in our 
ongoing research. 
Misunderstandings? 
We do not—as the response suggests—propose science capital as a “separate concept,” 
i.e., as an extra sort of capital that is “distinct” from cultural capital. Indeed, we go to 
pains in this paper and elsewhere (e.g., Archer et al., 2012) to explain that 
. . . “science capital” is not a separate “type” of capital but rather a conceptual device for 
collating various types of [ . . . ] capital that specifically relate to science [emphasis 
added] 
For example, see https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLun2jODy9M2cvE3bgJ-
UCc0dotvrSf 
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We are thus confused by the accusation of our supposed “push toward science capital as 
distinct from cultural capital.” As explained in the paper, we propose the concept as an 
organizing device to refer to science-related forms of cultural and social capital. 
We are also surprised by the accusation that we reify science and leave scientific 
institutions “unchallenged” and focus only on changing young people. This profoundly 
misrepresents our position in this paper and indeed across the body of our collective and 
individual work. Indeed, it is hard to square this accusation with the text in our 
discussion: 
. . . the task of science education interventions may not be to provide students with 
“more” or “better” science capital, but may instead need to focus on shifting relations 
within/across particular fields to better enable activation of facilitating forms of capital 
and/or changing which components of science capital are symbolically valued within 
particular fields. The latter clearly calls for a more radical shifting of power relations, 
calling into question, for instance, what is/counts as “science?” Whose science counts? 
(emphasis added) 
Don’t Throw The Baby Out With The Bathwater? 
The response argues that the concept of science capital “may undermine a focus on the 
ways in which inequalities and injustice in science education are coterminous with other 
forms of systemic inequality” and “could detract” from looking at similarities in patterns 
of exclusion across different contexts. But what is the basis of this view? Why would 
employing the concept preclude a concurrent analysis of the role of wider inequalities? 
We never claim that processes of inequality operate “just in one domain such as 
science”—that would be absurd (and would contradict much of our previous work). 
The responders argue that “nothing in Bourdieu’s account of cultural capital excludes 
scientific aspects of culture”—we agree, but also we would suggest that in its original 
form, Bourdieu’s sociology does seriously neglect the scientific-related dimension of 
cultural capital and provides no useful framework for addressing it. 
The response argues that “we should be cautious about adding to the volume of forms of 
capital” —but why? Why would this “risk obscuring the similar underpinnings of cultural 
exclusion in artistic, scientific, and other domains?” This is fundamentally a 
disagreement over the value of different analytic grain sizes. We utilize science capital as 
a lens to illuminate issues around science participation in greater detail. What is there a 
problem in working at different grain sizes across and between domains? Why must there 
be a “one size fits all” approach to analysis? 
The response asserts that “the phenomena described . . . should remain within the bounds 
of cultural capital” because “science . . . is already part of the institutionalized form of 
cultural capital.” We would not deny that science capital is a dimension of cultural capital 
(indeed, we propose it a way to highlight science-related aspects of cultural and social 
capital)—but why preclude science educators from ever looking at the workings of 
science-related aspects of cultural and social capital in a more focused way? 
We challenge the response’s position that we should not focus on science, only the 
“larger unjust sociocultural system.” Science is indeed just one domain but we believe 
that the way that inequalities play out specifically in relation to science participation is 
not yet fully understood or elaborated. We consider that it is equally useful is to adjust 
the metaphorical analytic microscope to a greater magnification and to zoom in on the 
case of science (which has been broadly neglected within Bourdieusian theory)—but this 
does not preclude a wider perspective on the issues. We are not proposing some 
totalitarian theory—just a new lens, to add to a wider toolkit, for looking at particular 
issues. 
Field 
The response asserts that we “undertheorize the role of field.” On the one hand, this is 
intriguing given our stated position in the paper on how the value and meaning of capital 
is determined by field. But, as indicated in the paper, we do see more scope for pushing 
our conceptualization further in relation to the role of field and our current work is 
exploring the conditions within which some use-value capital gets translated (or not) into 
exchange- value (science) capital and how, and why, the highest exchange value 
(symbolic) aspects of science capital are struggled over and get solidified or transformed 
within and across different fields. 
A Question of Praxis? 
We found the response curiously conservative in its irritation with our proposal of 
science capital. Admittedly, some people are quite doctrinal in their approach to 
Bourdieu, being reluctant to move beyond the original texts. However, we take the view, 
espoused by Bourdieu himself, that his concepts are “tools for putting into practice,” 
which we see as these tools being open to interpretation and development (not least given 
the sociohistorical construction of social theory). 
Finally, we differ from the response in our belief that there is a need to balance “big,” 
longer term political projects with pragmatic action in the present. For us, just 
“understand- ing” inequality is not good enough—while sociology has an important role 
to play as a “critical commentator” of society, we do not see this as sufficient. We are 
committed to producing work that also tries to improve the here and now in practical 
terms. And in this respect, we believe that the concept does offer some useful ways 
forward.2 
2Indeed, many science education policy makers and practitioners report finding the 
concept, and our findings and recommendations around it, useful for precisely this 
reason. 
 
